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2	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
3	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
4	Case No. 09-50026 (REG)
5	x
6	In the Matter of:
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8	MOTORS LIQUIDATION COMPANY, et al.
9	f/k/a General Motors Corporation, et al.,
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11	Debtors.
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15	United States Bankruptcy Court
16	One Bowling Green
17	New York, New York
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19	September 20, 2011
20	9:57 AM
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23	B E F O R E:
24	HON. ROBERT E. GERBER
25	U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

	Page 2
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2	HEARING re Debtors' Objection to Proof of Claim No. 45631 filed
3	by Steven Newman c/o Michael Green, Deceased
4	
5	HEARING re Notice of Presentment of Proposed Order Granting
6	Motors Liquidation Company GUC Trust's Objection to Claim Nos.
7	39218, 39219, 39220, 39221, and 39222 for Failure to Comply
8	with Amended Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 105(a) and
9	General Order M-390 Authorizing Implementation of Alternate
10	Dispute Procedures Including Mandatory Mediation
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25	Transcribed by: Lisa Bar-Leib

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2	APPEARANCES:
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17	BY: DONALD N. WATSON, ESQ.
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19	(TELEPHONICALLY)
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Page 4 PROCEEDINGS 1 2 THE COURT: Motors Liquidation. 3 MR. SMOLINSKY: Good morning, Your Honor. Joseph 4 Smolinsky of Weil, Gotshal & Manges for the post-effective date 5 debtors as well as for the Motors Liquidation Company GUC 6 Trust. 7 THE COURT: Thank you. Pause for a second, Mr. 8 Smolinsky. Do I have Donald Watson on the phone? 9 MR. WATSON (TELEPHONICALLY): Yes, Your Honor. Donald 10 Watson is here by phone. Also from my firm, we have Ms. Chan 11 Abney on behalf of Ms. Tanisha Gary. Donald Watson speaking 12 now. 13 THE COURT: All right. Gentlemen, I've read the 14 papers. I'll hear first from Mr. Smolinsky and then from you, 15 Mr. Watson. 16 MR. WATSON: Yes, sir. 17 THE COURT: This matter has been a source of 18 frustration to me. But reading the Watson firm's response, it 19 appears to me that there are two separate bases upon which I 20 have to grant Motors Liquidation's request. First, what seems 21 to be very strong and uncontroverted evidence that notice 22 repeatedly got to the law firm in some fashion. But even if we 23 put that aside, the underlying client's not being cooperative, 24 as you say, Mr. Watson -- even if you had responded fourteen 25 times over, you would have given me the same response you gave

on this motion. And although I don't like to penalize clients for the acts of their lawyers, if I can avoid it, the fact is that they had an ample opportunity to help themselves and they're not cooperating and they made their own bed. That's what I need both sides to address starting with you, Mr. Smolinsky.

MR. SMOLINSKY: Thank you, Your Honor. Mr. Watson and his colleagues come from a fairly sizeable and reputable and successful law firm. We therefore are not here seeking sanctions against the firm. In fact, the only thing that we do take issue with in their objection is the statement that they didn't receive notice. The affidavit of service demonstrates that not only did we send first-class mail -- by first-class mail the objection, but we also sent the objection by e-mail to Mr. Watson at the e-mail address that was indicated on the proof of claim form.

Now the objection itself highlights the fact that the clients of the firm have been less than cooperative in participating in the mediation program. What Mr. Watson describes as irreconcilable differences, I take issue with that characterization. I don't think that there is a difference in philosophy or legal strategy. I think it's just the fact that the client has not complied with the terms of the ADR order. It also is evident from the objection that the clients have been made aware of the punitive nature of the expungement of

the claim that could result from failure to participate.

So I don't think that it would be fair or equitable to the estate to allow the Hawkins' estate to have another bite at the apple and to bring in new counsel as requested by Mr.

Watson. I believe that the statements made in the objection relating to the lack of cooperation should be deemed to be evidence or Mr. Watson could quickly put on a narrative of the lack of cooperation and Your Honor should, based on that testimony, expunge the claim.

THE COURT: Am I right from what you said that I don't need to find anything vis-à-vis the Watson firm itself and I can rely solely on the failure to cooperate by the underlying claimants?

MR. SMOLINSKY: Your Honor, you've asked us to add a paragraph to the order which requires the Watson firm to appear. They obviously came in and called Your Honor prior to entry of the order. And we're happy to strike that paragraph from the order if Your Honor is inclined to do so, so that it would be just a basic order which expunges the claim based on the record of the hearing. But we would like Mr. Watson to confirm again, as evidence, that there has been no cooperation so we don't end up having to come back to court.

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Smolinsky, he put it in his papers. And under my case management order, allegations in motions are taken as true unless they're controverted. So if

you want -- I guess I could ask Mr. Watson to say it again, but he already said it once in his papers, and that's part of the record now, isn't it?

MR. SMOLINSKY: The only thing I'm concerned about,

Your Honor, is the statement in the objection that says there

are irreconcilable differences which would, in ordinary

circumstances, perhaps give rise to --

THE COURT: Require a motion to withdraw?

MR. SMOLINSKY: That's correct, Your Honor. And I think that if we make a record that irreconcilable differences is the fact that they won't appear when directed to do so by a Court and not the difference of philosophy or legal strategy then I'm fine relying on the rest of the objection as evidence.

THE COURT: Oh, fair enough. Mr. Watson, may I get your perspective, please?

MR. WATSON: Yes, just briefly, Your Honor. Because the Court had mentioned the possibility of referring the matter to a disciplinary body, we just thought it necessary to just confirm. We're not saying that the law firm did not give service. But there was no direct -- no deliberate attempt or deliberate failure or refusal to comply with the Court so I just wanted the record to reflect that. But we do apologize. Whatever the problem is and certainly with our law firm in terms of the receipt of mail, that needs to be -- certainly will be corrected.

With regard to the client's cooperation, I would just reiterate that we have not been able to get that cooperation.

And there is, in fact, differences of philosophy but a difference of philosophy in terms of how the case should be resolved or should have been resolved. But for purposes of this hearing, we will stand on our previous papers in terms of the lack of cooperation from the client.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Any desire to reply, Mr. Smolinsky?

MR. SMOLINSKY: Your Honor, I am concerned about this difference of philosophy. I don't want this order to be challenged later based on a failure of Mr. Watson to adequately represent the client's interest. I don't know how to square that but I do want a clean order so that we could no longer keep reserves for this claim. And perhaps simply putting in the order that no reserves need to be made for this claim is sufficient. And perhaps we should send a copy of the proposed order to the client's address if Mr. Watson provides us with that address and they could come into court and explain why there's a difference of philosophy which would give rise to not showing up at a mediation or refusing to cooperate.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to grant Motors

Liquidation's motion with some refinements in the order. And
the following are my findings of fact and bases for the
exercise of my discretion.

First, I find that notice was duly provided to the agent by, at the very least, e-mail and the efforts to telephonically communicate the agent and by the presumption of mailing which, while on occasion it can be refuted, has not been refuted here.

But I further find that with appropriate notice, I would have gotten the same response from the Watson firm that I got on this motion which says, in substance, two things. One, it says there are irreconcilable differences; but it also says that the client isn't cooperating. And while I normally would not, or at least would try not to penalize a client for counsel error, here, as I indicated in my opening remarks, the prejudice to the client that might otherwise result is the client's own doing.

So the Motors Liquidation's motion is granted with the following refinements:

You're to drop from the order any references to the quality of representation by the Watson firm. I'm satisfied that whatever might have happened before, any deficiencies were cured and that the Watson firm did ultimately respond;

Second, you are to say expressly, if you wish, Mr.

Smolinsky, that the estate need not reserve funds on account of this claim;

And, third, you are to provide that a copy of the order is to be mailed both by first-class mail and by a

mechanism, either Federal Express or certified mail or whatever you find most appropriate, that provides a proof of delivery.

And the effective date of this order will be three weeks after the order is mailed to the underlying Hawkins estate. I am not going to prejudge what I would do if suddenly they decided that either they wanted to cooperate or they wanted to appear. That's why we have a three-week gap in effectiveness. I imagine the estate can reserve for another three weeks.

I will hear from each of the two of you any suggestions for further refining the order, but that's my mindset, gentlemen. Mr. Smolinsky, first from you.

MR. SMOLINSKY: Your Honor, I presume that you would like us to serve not only Mr. Watson but also the claimant themselves. And I would only ask that Mr. Watson provide us with the correct mailing address.

THE COURT: Well, certainly, it had been my thought that it was going to go to both of them. Mr. Watson, my phone system doesn't pass sound in two directions at the same time. But I thought you wished to be heard.

MR. WATSON: I was just going to say that we'll absolutely provide the address --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. WATSON: -- for the claimant.

THE COURT: Okay. Any other mechanical matters that I

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need to attend to, either side? Okay. Hearing none, does that take care of Motors Liquidation for the day, Mr. Smolinsky? MR. SMOLINSKY: No, Your Honor. There's one other Before we get to it, there's a housekeeping matter. If you recall, when we had the Hawkins estate's motion on the first time there was also another claim of the estate of Larry Torres Rodriquez. You had a similar direction to us at the prior hearing. We did send out a notice of proposed order with the language that you asked us to include about having them call chambers to explain why it shouldn't be turned over to the grievance committee. As a courtesy, we called counsel after that hearing. We actually spoke to another attorney in the office who said that they would speak to the attorney in charge and get back to us. We haven't heard anything. I don't know if Your Honor has heard anything. But at this point, we'd like to have Your Honor execute that order and we'll serve it with the language that Your Honor directed us to. THE COURT: It saddens me to have to do that but I think that's exactly what I need to do, Mr. Smolinsky. So make

it happen.

MR. SMOLINSKY: We will submit it to chambers, Your Honor.

The last matter on the agenda is an objection to the claim of Steven Newman which is a representative for the estate of Michael Green. On Friday, Your Honor received a letter

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asking for an adjournment noting that Mr. Donovan, counsel to the plaintiff, was on trial and couldn't make it. We have a mandate from our client to resolve all the remaining claims issues as quickly as possible. And Your Honor knows that we've been doing that largely without the use of judicial resources. But we do bring to your attention areas where there is some concern.

We had agreed to adjourn this matter once before at the request of Mr. Green. Of course, we did that -- Mr. Donovan. Of course, we did that willingly. And we did it with the tacit agreement that their objection -- their reply to the objection would be filed no later than the 6th of September. We would have a week to reply and then today would be the hearing on the matter. Mr. Donovan agreed to those dates. It was included in the notice of adjournment.

The 6th came and went. We didn't receive a response. We then called Mr. Donovan, left a message; no response. We left another message a day later. A secretary called back saying that Mr. Donovan received the message but she couldn't tell us anything about the circumstances. We then sent a letter by FedEx to Mr. Donovan telling him that his failure to respond would be treated as a default. Heard no response. And then Friday, he sent a letter directly to you; did not reach out to us for an adjournment.

Mr. Donovan is not here. Mr. Donovan is on trial in

New Jersey. We, of course, understand if Your Honor agrees to adjourn this matter. However, this is a seventy-five million dollar claim. Mr. Donovan's clients have already received twenty-two million dollars in cash from the pre-petition debtors on account of the claim. And we need to proceed because a seventy-five million dollar claim does make an impact on distributions to creditors. So we would ask Your Honor, if Your Honor is inclined, to grant the request for an adjournment to provide in that order of adjournment a specific deadline to respond and a specific hearing date.

THE COURT: Yeah. I saw that letter and I sensed the frustration. And I have it, too. I will authorize one final seven-day extension. The order is to expressly provide there will be no further extensions. And it's to expressly provide that your opponent is to work nights or weekends to get it in if he is busy during the daytime. I've had it with this. fed up. Seven days from the date of entry. And if you give me an order with that content today, it'll be entered today.

MR. SMOLINSKY: Thank you, Your Honor. And we'll work out a hearing date. Maybe we'll pick one and if he's not available on that date, we'll come to chambers and get a quick new date that works for both of us.

THE COURT: I understand. This is not a small claim. This is a very, very major claim against the estate and I would have expected counsel to deal with it responsibly -- your

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Page 14 opponent to deal with it responsibly. MR. SMOLINSKY: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Anything else? MR. SMOLINSKY: No, sir. THE COURT: Okay. Then have a good day. MR. SMOLINSKY: Thank you. (Whereupon these proceedings were concluded at 10:16 a.m.) 

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8	granted with order to contain language:		
9	(a) removing reference to Mr. Watson's law		
10	firm; (b) that says estate need not reserve		
11	funds on account of this claim; and (c) that		
12	says a copy of the order was mailed both		
13	by first-class mail and by a second means		
14	that provides a proof of delivery		
15	Debtors' objection to proof of claim no. 45631	13	13
16	filed by Steven Newman c/o Michael Green,		
17	deceased adjourned for seven days with		
18	no further extensions		
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Page 16 1 2 CERTIFICATION 3 4 I, Lisa Bar-Leib, certify that the foregoing transcript is a 5 true and accurate record of the proceedings. Digitally signed by Lisa Bar-Leib 6 Lisa Bar-DN: cn=Lisa Bar-Leib, o, ou. email=digital1@veritext.com, Leib C=US Date: 2011.09.26 11:36:10 -04'00' 7 LISA BAR-LEIB 8 9 AAERT Certified Electronic Transcriber (CET\*\*D-486) 10 11 Veritext 12 200 Old Country Road 13 Suite 580 14 Mineola, NY 11501 15 16 Date: September 25, 2011 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25